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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents, Frank Brgoch and Seymour Isaacs, appealed the trial
court's ruling granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The only issues raised on
appeal by Plaintiffs were whether the trial court's ruling, that Defendants/Appellees/Petitioners,
Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc., Linsco Financial Services, Inc., and Linsco/Private
Ledger Corporation (collectively referred to as "Private Ledger"), were not liable to Plaintiffs,
violated the doctrine of apparent authority and whether disputed issues of material fact precluded
summary judgment. Brief of Appellants at 2.
After briefing and oral argument, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision (not for
publication) on April 18, 1996. (Addendum A) In that decision the court held that the trial
court's reasoning was incorrect. This Court stated that "The general rule is that a principal is
liable for injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during the existence of the

agency and within the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority." Brgoch v. Harry. Case
No. 950238, slip op. at 1 (Utah Ct. App. filed April 18, 1996). This Court further held that
whether an agency relationship exists and the scope of the agent's authority are questions of fact
which should be determined by a jury in all but the clearest cases and that the fact that an agent
commits an act which is criminal "does not automatically shield the principal from all
responsibility vis-a-vis an innocent third party." Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Furthermore, when the
law was applied to the facts of this case, this Court determined that the trial court's conclusion
was incorrect and that questions of fact remained regarding the scope of the agency relationship
between Harry and Private Ledger.

l

LL.

Private Ledger filed a Petition for Rehearing and this Court has requested this response
from Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs.
ARGUMENT
The arguments contained in Private Ledger's Petition for Rehearing are somewhat
difficult to discern because they frequently overlap. However, three things must be remembered
about Private Ledger's petition. First, Private Ledger's arguments are frequently based on
disputed issues of material fact and represent only the facts which are favorable to Private
Ledger.

Private Ledger's reliance on facts which support only its position is specifically

contrary to the standard of review required of this Court in summary judgment cases.
Furthermore, Private Ledger's reliance on disputed facts plainly ignores this Court's holding that
the scope of the agency relationship and the perception of the third party concerning the agent's

J

The court also determined that the judgment could not be sustained on alternative grounds urged by
Private Ledger concerning the statute of limitations. Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Because Private Ledger failed
to cross-appeal, that issue was not properly before this Court. Private Ledger apparently does not raise
any issue concerning the statute of limitations in its Petition for Rehearing.
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apparent authority are questions of fact which should be decided by a jury in all but the clearest
cases. Slip op. at 2. Second, Private Ledger refers to a supposed variety of cases which it
claims support its position. However, Private Ledger relies on only two of those cases in its
Petition for Rehearing and those cases simply do not withstand close scrutiny. The cases cited
by Private Ledger are either factually or legally distinguishable. Finally, Private Ledger,
throughout the course of this appeal and continuing in its Petition for Rehearing, has steadfastly
refused to address the primary case which controls the outcome of this case, Horrocks v.
Westfalia Svstemat. 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
POINT I
THIS COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK OR MISAPPREHEND
POINTS OF LAW AND FACT IN ITS DECISION. RATHER,
PRIVATE LEDGER'S ASSERTIONS REST ON DISPUTED
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.
Private Ledger first asserts that this Court erroneously interpreted the facts and relied too
much on a single statement made by the trial court in its decision in this case. In making this
argument, Private Ledger first sets forth several facts which it represents as "uncontroverted."
In fact, the facts are controverted. For example, Private Ledger claims that "It is undisputed
that, for purposes of Private Ledger's records, . . . the transfer of plaintiffs' funds to bank
accounts in their names at FNB in Kansas was entirely proper." Petition for Rehearing at 2-3.
In fact, Private Ledger fails to disclose that the transfer was effectuated only because its agent,
Defendant Harry, forged the Plaintiffs' signatures on the transfer documents. (R. 601-02, 60607) The issue of whether this forgery could have been spotted by comparison of the signatures
on the transfer documents to Plaintiffs' actual signatures on file with Private Ledger has not yet
been the subject of discovery in this case. Private Ledger now knows that the transfer was
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effectuated only through its agent's fraud and its representation of the incomplete facts on this
point can only be characterized as self-serving.

At another point, Private Ledger states

"Plaintiffs did not produce a single shred of evidence indicating that Private Ledger had any
knowledge of, or involvement in, the Red River transactions." Petition for Rehearing at 3. This
statement overlooks the larger issue of "selling away" and ignores evidence presented to the trial
court by the Plaintiffs which indicated that Private Ledger was aware of the practice of "selling
away" by its agents and did little to control the practice. Also, Private Ledger must remember
this case has not yet been tried. (R. 618-19) These instances demonstrate that disputed issues
of fact remain regarding virtually all of the issues in this case and that summary judgment should
have been foreclosed, as this Court rightly held.
Private Ledger next argues that this Court focused only on one statement in the trial
judge's ruling as a basis for its decision. Petition for Rehearing at 3. Private Ledger claims that
examination of the entire oral ruling of the trial court would place the judge's statement in a
different context. This claim simply does not withstand scrutiny.
In granting Private Ledger's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court stated,
The question I have is just how far can be reached when the defendant in
this matter, Private Ledger, has gone to what I think is more than sufficient steps
to ensure that activities by the registered agent were pursuant to their policies.
. . . In essence, it appears that when a registered representative of a
brokerage firm clearly violates the firm's policies and engages in unauthorized
activities without the knowledge of Private Ledger in this matter, I just cannot see
how liability can be imposed upon the principal, Private Ledger, in this matter.
The fact that Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of defrauding Private
Ledger crystallizes my opinion in that one cannot be an agent of the principal
at the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent. They are
mutually exclusive actions and terms.
(R. 847-48, emphasis added). The emphasized statements are the statements at issue which
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Private Ledger now seeks to minimize. However, what Private Ledger does not reveal is that
these same statements were also incorporated into the trial court's written order which stated:
"The fact Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes the
court's opinion in that one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in
conduct which is criminally fraudulent as to Private Ledger. They are mutually exclusive
actions and terms." (R. 821) In fact, this was the only reasoning included in the trial court's
Order. (Addendum B) Despite Private Ledger's protestations to the contrary, the original
quotation itself as well as the court's written order amply show that the trial court's focus was
totally misplaced, was contrary to the weight of authority, as this Court correctly held, and
simply ignored the doctrine of apparent authority.
With respect to the trial court's statements, this Court stated "The trial court cited no
authority in support of this proposition and we are aware of none. . . . simply because the agent
commits an act that is criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all responsibility
vis-a-vis an innocent third party." Slip op. at 1-2. This Court's opinion was correct on this
issue. Horrocks, 892 P.2d at 16-17.
Private Ledger then concludes this point in its argument with a rather strange assertion.
It states "The following issues for review were presented on appeal [by Private Ledger] but
overlooked in this Court's memo decision . . . ." Private Ledger then gives a "laundry list" of
issues and factual statements with little or no supporting argument. Petition for Rehearing at
5-6. However, as was correctly noted in Appellants' Reply Brief, most, if not all of these issues
were not properly before this Court and, therefore, were properly disregarded by this Court
because Private Ledger did not file a cross-appeal. Private Ledger failed to disclose in its brief
as it does in its Petition for Rehearing that some of the issues presented were ruled upon by the
5

trial court in a manner adverse to Private Ledger. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 2-6, 12-14.
When an issue is resolved by the trial court against a party, that party must raise the issue either
on direct or cross appeal and may not wait until the briefing stage of an appeal to raise the issue.
State v. South. 885 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Henrettv v. Manti City Corp.. 791
P.2d 506, 511 (Utah 1990); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984).
Because of the trial court's disposition of several of these issues and Private Ledger's failure to
cross-appeal that disposition, many of the issues listed by Private Ledger in its Petition for
Rehearing and its Brief to this Court were simply not properly before this Court and should not
have been considered by the Court.
POINT II
CONTRARY TO PRIVATE LEDGER'S CLAIM, THIS
COURT OVERLOOKED NOTHING WHEN IT HELD THAT
THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WAS
A DISPUTED ISSUE OF FACT.
In the next point in the Petition for Rehearing, Private Ledger claims that
"uncontroverted evidence" supported its motion for summary judgment.

This argument

disregards the standard of review in summary judgment cases and overlooks evidence presented
by the Plaintiffs.2
This case was decided on summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only
when no issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as
a matter of law. K&T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 626-27 (Utah 1994); Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the
2

Because of space considerations, the "uncontroverted evidence" presented in Private Ledger's
Petition for Rehearing cannot be reviewed in detail. However, as will be pointed out in the text,
sufficient evidence was produced by the Plaintiffs which, according to the standard of review, must be
accepted by this Court, to withstand the Private Ledger's Motion for Summary Judgment.
6

appellate court must review the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought. K&T, Inc., 888 P.2d
at 624; Higgms, 855 P.2d at 233. Therefore, when Private Ledger presents only evidence
favorable to it and ignores contradictory evidence, it neglects the standard of review and its
evidence should be disregarded.
Contrary to Private Ledger's claim that "Plaintiffs presented no evidence to show that
they had in fact made their Red River investments in the belief that Harry was doing so as the
authorized agent of Private Ledger," the following evidence which, according to the standard
of review, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, was presented to the trial
court. Ronald Allen Harry was a registered agent and branch manager of Defendant Private
Ledger's Salt Lake City branch office from January 1988 until November 1989. Harry's
business cards, stationery and title at the office held Harry out as the branch manager of Private
Ledger in Salt Lake City. (R. 602, 607) Harry managed Plaintiffs' retirement portfolios while
he worked as the branch manager at the Salt Lake City office of Private Ledger. (R. 600, 605)
Both Plaintiffs stated in affidavits that Harry held himself out as manager of the Salt Lake City
office and that their dealings with Harry occurred at the Salt Lake City office of Private Ledger.
(R. 601-602, 606, 607) Both Brgoch and Isaacs affirmatively stated that they were never told
that Harry was acting as any type of independent contractor and that they were only informed
that Harry was the manager of the Private Ledger Salt Lake City branch. (R. 602, 607)
Furthermore, Brgoch and Isaacs each received statements from Private Ledger noting that funds
had been transferred from their account. Another broker in the Salt Lake City office, Cregg
Cannon, provided an affidavit that stated that Cannon had raised the issue of selling outside
limited partnerships to officials of Private Ledger on at least one occasion and that he was led
7

to believe that Private Ledger, while not officially sanctioning the conduct, would "look the
other way" when such conduct occurred.

(R. 618-19) Cannon specifically stated, "My

impression was that they [Private Ledger] didn't care about such action and that the action went
on from various representatives and that if, in fact, I sold private securities they didn't want to
know or be informed about those sales." (R. 619) Cannon also stated that Private Ledger's
supervision over its agents and offices was non-existent. (R. 619) Finally, when Private Ledger
did become aware of Harry's unauthorized and criminal actions, it did not contact specific
investors whose funds had been placed at risk by Harry and inform them immediately of the
unauthorized transactions carried out by Harry.
To Brgoch and Isaacs, Harry had been cloaked with authority by Private Ledger to
conduct the trades at issue. In short, evidence presented to the trial court demonstrated, as this
Court correctly held, that the precise scope of Harry's agency relationship with Private Ledger
was an issue of fact which can only be discerned after more discovery and a trial in this matter.
POINT III
THE CASES CITED BY PRIVATE LEDGER DO NOT
SUPPORT ITS POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF APPARENT
AUTHORITY.
In Point III of the petition, Private Ledger claims that "This court's analysis [on the issue
of apparent authority] is clearly contrary to that of numerous cases . . . ." Petition for
Rehearing at 9. Despite the reference to "numerous cases," Private Ledger's petition discusses
only one case in this section. That case, FSC Securities Corp., v. McCormack, 630 So.2d 979
(Miss. 1994), is easily distinguishable from this case. Private Ledger fails to disclose relevant
facts which determine the outcome of that case that are not present here.
First, Private Ledger does not reveal that FSC Securities was an appeal from a trial, not
8

from summary judgment as is this case. FSC Securities 630 So.2d at 980. Three days of
evidence had been received by the trial court and a fully developed record was presented to the
appellate court for review. In this case, no trial has been held. Additionally, Private Ledger
does not state that a determinative factor in FSC Securities, on which the appellate court based
its holding, was the fact that the plaintiffs had notice that the agent in that case was acting for
himself rather than for defendant FSC Securities. 630 So.2d at 986. Indeed, the Mississippi
Supreme Court cited ample evidence which supported that conclusion. For example, as opposed
to this case, the agent in FSC Securities met with the plaintiffs at their home, not at a place of
business. 630 So.2d at 982. Also contrary to the facts of this case, in FSC Securities the
agent's stationery and business cards contained the names of both his own company and FSC
Securities. IcL Finally, the plaintiffs in that case gave the agent checks made out to the agent's
own company, not to defendant FSC Securities IcL
All of the foregoing facts distinguish FSC Securities from this case. Here, Plaintiffs
Brgoch and Isaacs only ever dealt with Harry at the Private Ledger office in Salt Lake City.
When they needed to contact Harry, they contacted him at the Private Ledger office. Harry's
business cards and letterhead announced Harry as the manager of the Private Ledger office in
Salt Lake City. (R. 602, 607) Furthermore, Brgoch and Isaacs were never informed that Harry
was acting on his own behalf or even that he could have acted on his own behalf. (R. 602, 607)
For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs, Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and
under its control and authority. The record clearly demonstrates that the transfer of funds from
Plaintiffs' Private Ledger accounts was reported to Plaintiffs on Private Ledger statement sheets.
(R. 600, 605) These facts distinguish this case from FSC Securities.
Finally, Private Ledger asserts that FSC Securities stands for the proposition that an
9

analysis of apparent authority should first determine "whether the principals knowingly and/or
negligently permitted their agents to claim they were acting within the scope of their authority."
Petition for Rehearing at 10. No Utah authority is cited in support of this proposition. Private
Ledger does not reveal that this proposition is based on Arkansas law and is contrary to the
Restatement (Second) of Agency which this Court follows.3 However, even if this Court adopts
this interpretation of the law, issues of fact raised by the plaintiffs make this issue one to be
determined by the trier of fact, not by this Court.
Because this proposition is from Arkansas law (dating to a 1937 case, Central Surety and
Ins. Corp. v. O. & S. Wholesale Co.. 101 SW 2d 167, 172 (Ark. 1937)), it does not consider
the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which is followed by this Court. For example, §161 of
the Restatement specifically states:
Unauthorized acts of general agent
A general agent for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal subjects his
principal to liability for acts done on his accounts which usually accompany or
are incidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct if, although
they are forbidden by the principal, the other party reasonably believes that the
agent is authorized to do them and has no notice that he is not so authorized.
Restatement (Second) of Agency §161 (1958). Comment d to this section, which concerns the
powers of managers, has specific application to this case. That comment states:
d. Powers of Managers. In accordance with the rules stated in this
Section, a disclosed or partially disclosed principal who entrusts an agent with the
management of a business is subject to liability to third persons with whom the
agent enters into transactions usual in such business, although contrary to the

3

While the statement concerning the conduct of the principal does appear in FSC Securities, that
statement is an interpretation of Arkansas law. When the statement appears in FSC Securities a federal
case from the Western District of Arkansas, Barker v. FSC Securities Corp., 133 F.R.D. 548 (W.D.
Ark. 1989), is given as the source of the proposition. Examination of Barker reveals that the proposition
is derived from an Eighth Circuit case which clearly stated that it was interpreting Arkansas law. Barker,
133 F.R.D. at 551, citing Wal-Mart Stores. Inc. v. Crist. 855 F.2d 1326, 1331 (8th Cir. 1988).
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directions of the principal, unless the third person has notice of such directions.
Restatement (Second) of Agency §161, comment d (1958). The plain intent of the Restatement
is contrary to Private Ledger's claim that the conduct of the principal should be the initial focus
of inquiry. In several sections the Restatement stands for the proposition that an agent can
disregard specific instructions from a principal and still act to bind the principal. See, e.g..
Restatement §8, comment d; Restatement §262. Horrocks incorporates that position into Utah
law.
Finally, even if this Court adopts the FSC Securities proposition, unresolved factual
issues preclude this Court from ruling as a matter of law that no agency relationship existed.
The FSC Securities proposition states that an inquiry should occur as to "whether the principals
knowingly and/or negligently permitted their agents to claim they were acting within the scope
of their authority." (Emphasis added.) In this case, Plaintiffs' evidence indicated that Private
Ledger was aware of the practice of "selling away" by its agents and did little to control the
practice. (R. 618-19) Some testimony even indicated that Private Ledger, though aware of the
problem, turned its back on the problem and chose to ignore the actions of its agents. (R. 619)
These facts raise unresolved issues concerning Private Ledger's negligence in permitting its
agents to engage in unauthorized conduct despite contrary written agreements. This reinforces
this Court's holding that issues of material fact concerning the agency relationship in this case
can only be resolved by the trier of fact.
POINT IV
THIS COURT CORRECTLY RELIED ON HORROCKS
WHICH IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THIS CASE.
In the fourth and sixth points of the petition, Private Ledger makes a broad assertion that
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this Court's reliance on Horrocks is misplaced because, Private Ledger claims, Horrocks is
distinguishable.4 In fact, Private Ledger is unable to distinguish Horrocks.
In Horrocks, which was not available to the trial court at the time of its ruling, an agent,
unbeknownst to the third party/buyer and the principal/seller, left the area apparently "making
off with the undelivered equipment [belonging to the buyer] and cash [belonging to the
principal]." 892 P.2d at 15. This Court stated that the central issue in Horrocks was whether
"[The principal] should bear the responsibility for the unauthorized, adverse acts of its agent."
892 P.2d at 15. The principal argued that the agent was acting outside the scope of his
authority, was acting in his own self-interests, and that his actions were adverse to the principal.
Id. This is exactly the argument that Private Ledger has made here with respect to its agent.
In Horrocks, this Court soundly rejected this argument. The court stated that basic
agency law requires that a principal be bound by the acts of an agent clothed with apparent
authority. 892 P.2d at 15. This Court stated that even when an agent's acts adversely impact
its principal, the principal is still liable for the agent's actions as against an unknowing and
innocent third party. Specifically, the court stated:

The loss that results from [the agent's] misconduct must borne by the party who
empowered [the agent] to commit the wrong. "Where a loss is to be suffered
through the misconduct of an agent, it should be borne by those who put it in his

4

Private Ledger's argument on this point contains statements regarding facts which are misleading.
Specifically, Private Ledger's petition states "Had plaintiffs presented sworn affidavits or depositions
indicating that, for example, (1) they made their checks for the Red River investment out to Private
Ledger, (2) those checks had been cashed by Private Ledger, (3) they executed investment forms provided
by Private Ledger to make the Red River investment, and (4) that the Red River investment had appeared
on the Private Ledger account statements, such evidence may have given rise to issues of fact precluding
summary judgment." Petition for Rehearing at 12. Private Ledger knows that no checks for the Red
River investment were issued by Plaintiffs in this case and that the only documents relating to the transfer
of Plaintiffs' funds were those documents which were forged by defendant Harry and Harry had
discretionary investment authority which Private Ledger claims is prohibited.
12

power to do the wrong" County of Macon Shores. 397 U.S. 272, 279, 24 L. Ed.
889, 890 (1877); See also Vickers, 607 P.2d at 607; Harrison. 257 P. at 679-80.
[The principal] placed [the agent] in the position to perpetrate a fraud.
Consequently, [the principal] must bear the responsibility for [the agent's]
misconduct.
. . . Even when the agent is acting adversely to the principal's interest, the
knowledge of the agent may still be imputed to the principal.
892 P.2d at 16-17. In Horrocks this Court adopted the position that a principal who cloaks an
agent with apparent authority must suffer the loss due to an agent's misconduct even when the
agent's misconduct has harmed the principal itself.
In Horrocks the court analyzed facts which led the plaintiff there to believe that the agent
was acting within his authority when he committed fraudulent actions. 892 P.2d at 16. In this
case also, the facts show that Plaintiffs perceived Defendant Harry to be cloaked with apparent
authority by Private Ledger. To the plaintiffs, Defendant Harry had authority derived from his
managerial position with Private Ledger to sell the securities at issue. For all appearances to
Plaintiffs, Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and under its control and authority.
This Court correctly applied Horrocks when it held that the trial court erroneously
concluded that Harry's criminal activities freed Private Ledger from any liability to Plaintiffs
Brgoch and Isaacs. This Court, in all likelihood considering the conflicting evidence contained
within the record, correctly ruled that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to
Private Ledger and that questions remain concerning the agency relationship which could only
be resolved by a trier of fact.
POINT V
OTHER CASES CITED BY PRIVATE LEDGER ARE
EASILY DISTINGUISHABLE.
In Point V of the petition, Private Ledger claims that this Court's decision ignores "at
13

least five separate decisions" to the contrary.5 The cases cited by Private Ledger are easily
distinguishable from this case.
The first case cited, but not discussed, by Private Ledger is Bates v. Shearson Lehman
Bros. Inc.. 42 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 1994). That case is easily distinguishable on its facts. There
the First Circuit expressly held that there was no evidence of any representation or conduct to
suggest to the plaintiff that the agent had authority to act for the principal. The court stated that
the agent, while working for the principal, never opened an account with the principal for the
plaintiff. The agent always visited the plaintiff's home to procure money from her; she never
went to an office. Checks issued by the plaintiff were never made payable to the principal but
rather were always made payable to the agent's personal bank. Finally, the agent "never
expressly told or otherwise represented to [plaintiff] that her funds would be invested with [the
principal]." 42 F.3d at 82. Furthermore, the court stated that the principal had no way of
knowing of the existence of the plaintiff because the agent never opened an account for the
plaintiff. Id. Indeed, the facts of Bates seem to suggest that it is doubtful that the plaintiff even
knew that the agent worked for the principal. In contrast, in this case, Plaintiffs Brgoch and
Isaacs routinely visited Private Ledger's office when they sought to deal with Defendant Harry.
Harry's business cards and letterhead announced that he was the manager for Private Ledger.
Brgoch and Isaacs had an account with Private Ledger. Even the fraudulent transfer of funds
appeared on a Private Ledger account statement. For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs,
Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and under its control and authority. Private
Ledger's claim that this case is indistinguishable from Bates is insupportable.

5

Although Private Ledger's petition states that five decisions are involved, only two opinions from
other courts, neither of which is binding on this Court, are cited or discussed in the petition.
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Private Ledger also discusses Hauser v. FarrelL 14 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 1994), to support
its argument. However, as Private Ledger reluctantly acknowledged in its Amended Brief of
Appellees, a significant fact in Hauser distinguishes it from this case. In Hauser the plaintiff/
investors "did not . . . contradict the brokers' representations that they told the customer that
the [investment] would not be through [the brokerage firm]." 14 F.3d at 1433. In other words,
unlike this case where Defendant Harry never informed Brgoch and Isaacs that the investment
was not sanctioned by Private Ledger nor did Private Ledger inform Brgoch and Isaacs that
Harry was acting as an independent contractor, the defendants in Hauser were specifically
informed that the defendant brokerage firm did not sanction the investment at issue in that case.
Examination of the cases cited by Private Ledger provides ample basis to distinguish
them from this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Private Ledger's Petition for Rehearing should be denied. In
the alternative, should the court grant the petition, additional briefing should be permitted in
those areas in which the court has concerns.
DATED this 6th day of June, 1996.
NYGAARD, C O ^ & ^ I ^ C E N T

RANDY B. COKE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of June, 1996, two copies of the foregoing
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING were either hand delivered or mailed, in the
U. S. mail, postage prepaid, to counsel as follows:
S. Baird Morgan
STRONG & HANNI
6th Floor, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
Michael L. Kirby, Esq.
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT
600 West Broadway, Suite 1100
San Diego, California 92101-3335
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees/Petitioner Private Ledger
J. Michael Coombs
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Defendant Ronald Allen Harry
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 950238-CA
v.
Ronald Allen Harry, an
individual; Private Ledger
Financial Services, Inc.;
Linsco Financial Services,
Inc.; Linsco/Private Ledger
Corporation; and Does 1 to 10,

F I L E D
( A p r i l 18, 1996)

Defendants and Appellees.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
Attorneys

Randy B. Coke and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City,
for Appellants
S. Baird Morgan, Salt Lake City, Michael L. Kirby and
Jeffrey P. Lendrum, San Diego, California, for
Appellees
J. Michael Coombs, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Ronald Harry

Before Judges Orme, Jackson, and Wilkins.
ORME, Presiding Judge:
The trial court granted defendants' summary judgment motion,
concluding that Private Ledger was not liable, as a matter of
law, for the acts or omissions of defendant Harry. In its order
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the trial court
explained that "one cannot be an agent of the principal at the
same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as
to Private Ledger." However, the trial court cited no authority
in support of this proposition and we are aware of none. Nor
have defendants called our attention to any such authority.
Rather, the general rule is that a principal is liable for
injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during
the existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent's
actual or apparent authority. See Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 161 (1958); Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 15-16
(Utah App. 1995); Poulsen v. Treasure State Indus.. Inc.. 626

P.2d 822, 829 (Mont. 1981). Moreover, whether an agency
relationship exists and the scope of the agent's authority are
questions of fact to be determined by a jury in all but the
clearest cases. C^rrUl, Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co.. 891 P.2d
57, 62 (Wyo. 1995); Mauch v. Kisslina. 783 P.2d 601, 605 (Wash.
App. 198 9) . Simply because the agent commits an act that is
criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all
responsibility vis-a-vis an innocent third party.
In this case, the trial court's reasoning that "one cannot
be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in conduct
which is criminally fraudulent," is simply not a correct
statement of the law. Questions of fact remain as to the
existence of the agency relationship between Harry and defendants
and the scope of Harry's authority.
Nor are we able to sustain the judgment on the alternative
ground urged by defendants before the trial court, namely that
plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
While traditional application of the discovery rule might suggest
the claims are time-barred given plaintiffs' concession that they
knew of some wrongdoing immediately upon receipt of the first
statement sent by the Bank of Onaga, the result is otnerwise
given the contention that Harry fraudulently concealed his
misdeeds. See Berenda v. Langford. 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah
1996). See also State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1156 (Utah App.
1994) (noting that "Harry deceived [plaintiffs] both before and
after the transaction" in question).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants and remand the case for a trial
on the merits or such other proceedings as may now be
appropriate.

Gregory B^urrae7
Presidrrig Judge

WE CONCUR:

tforman H. Jacl^on, Judge

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge
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S. Baird Morgan, Esq. (Utah Bar No. 2314)
STRONG & HANNI
6th Floor, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 532-7080
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Michael L. Kirby, Esq. (Cal. Bar No. 050895)
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT
600 West Broadway, Suite 1100
San Diego, California 92101-3355
(619) 231-8666
Attorneys for Defendants
PRIVATE LEDGER FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., and
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORATION
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FRANK BRGOCH and SEYMOUR
ISAACS,

]
]i ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an
individual; PRIVATE LEDGER
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.;
]
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,;i Civil No. C92-1463
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORA- ]
TION; and DOES 1 to 10,
! Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
Defendants.

;

The motion of Defendants, Private Ledger Financial Services,
Inc., Linsco Financial Services, Inc. and Linsco/Private Ledger
Corporation for summary judgment, having come before the aboveentitled Court, the Honorable Glenn Iwasaki, District Court Judge,

000820

presiding
represented

and
by

Plaintiffs
Randy

B.

Frank
Coke of

Brgoch

and

Nygaard,

Seymour
Coke

&

Isaacs
Vincent,

Defendants-movants being represented by S. Baird Morgan of Strong
& Hanni and Michael L. Kirby of Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, and
attorney John Michael Coombs being present on behalf of Defendant,
Ronald Allen Harry and the Court having received and reviewed the
memoranda, affidavits and other document of record and being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters its Order as
follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that the motion of

Defendants,

Private

Ledger

Financial

Services

Inc.,

Linsco

Financial Services, inc., and Linsco/Private Ledger Corporation,
based on the statute of limitations, is denied on the grounds that
the Court finds a question of fact to exist

as to possible

concealment of Plaintiff's claims by Defendant, Ronald Harry. The
motion of said Defendants for summary judgment on the grounds that
said Defendants are not liable, as a matter of law, for the acts or
omissions of Defendant Ronald Allen Harry is granted, dismissing
with prejudice and on the merits all claims of Plaintiffs against
Defendants.

The fact Mr. Harry was criminally

convicted of

defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes the Court's opinion in that
one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging
in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as to Private Ledger.
They are mutually exclusive actions and terms.

The Court further

2

GOO

finds pursuant to its ruling of May 17, 1994, the transcript of
which is incorporated herein.
day of

DATED this

, 1994.

Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Judge
APPROVAL

Randy B. Coke
Attoi^ey for Plairnt^P\s

JOKI Michael Coon
Atforney for Defendant Ronald
Tllen Harry
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